Details

Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process


Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process

The Argentine Senate in Comparative Perspective
IDE-JETRO Series

von: Hirokazu Kikuchi

71,39 €

Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan
Format: PDF
Veröffentl.: 11.07.2018
ISBN/EAN: 9783319901138
Sprache: englisch

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Beschreibungen

This book rethinks gubernatorial effects on national politics using the case of the Argentine Senate. Simultaneously analyzing senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor, Kikuchi argues that senators strategically change their actions according to stages in the legislative process, and that longstanding governors may influence national politics, causing their senators to shelve unwanted presidential bills at the committee stage. He explains senatorial behavior focusing on varieties in the combinations of principals, whose preferences senators must take into account, and shows that legislators under the same electoral system do not necessarily behave in the same way. He also demonstrates that this argument can be applied to cases from other federal countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Based on rich qualitative evidence and quantitative data, the book offers a theoretical framework for understanding how some governors may influence national politics.
1. Introduction2. Political Careers and the Legislative Process under Federalism3. Committees, Floor, and the Four Types of Senators4. The Drawer of Committees5. Bosses at the Frontline6. Conclusion
Hirokazu Kikuchi is an associate senior research fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO), Chiba, Japan. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. His research focuses on legislative politics, executive-legislative relations, electoral systems, and civil society organizations.
This book rethinks gubernatorial effects on national politics using the case of the Argentine Senate. Simultaneously analyzing senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor, Kikuchi argues that senators strategically change their actions according to stages in the legislative process, and that longstanding governors may influence national politics, causing their senators to shelve unwanted presidential bills at the committee stage. He explains senatorial behavior focusing on varieties in the combinations of principals, whose preferences senators must take into account, and shows that legislators under the same electoral system do not necessarily behave in the same way. He also demonstrates that this argument can be applied to cases from other federal countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Based on rich qualitative evidence and quantitative data, the book offers a theoretical framework for understanding how some governors may influence national politics.
Uses various sources including original datasets, archival records, and interviews with legislators to support argumentFulfills the gap between theoretical arguments and empirical findingsAnalyses the Argentine Senate: an ideal laboratory for considering these questions as it incorporates experienced politicians (e.g., former presidents and former governors) as well as inexperienced backbenchers. Moreover, the Argentine federalism consists of a wide variety in provincial politics allowing for a wide comparison of sub-units in the country

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